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Protocols for implementing contract signing, confidential disclosures, and certified mail in 
an electronic mail system are proposed. These transactions are provably impossible without a 
trusted intermediary. However, they can be implemented with just a small probability of a 
participant cheating his partner, by use of a beacon emitting random integers. Applications 
include privacy protection of personal information in data banks, as well as the protection of 
business transactions. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Digital signatures enable a person to prepare and sign a document for transmission 
through electronic mail [3,4,6]. Digital signatures, however, do not by themselves 
provide procedures for protection of transactions involving more than one person, 
which the business community of users of electronic mail needs to perform. Of 
particular interest are the signing of contracts, disclosure of confidential information, 
and certified mail. 
Assume that Alice and Bob negotiate over the telephone a contract CONT stating 
that Alice will sell her house to Bob for a certain price. If Alice signs CONT (say by 
use of a digital signature) and sends it to Bob, then he has the option of delaying the 
return of CONT signed by him while he looks around for a better/cheaper house. 
During this time Alice is already committed to the deal. 
The usual method for overcoming this problem, when Alice and Bob cannot 
actually get together, is to use a trusted intermediary who gets Alice’s signed contract 
and holds it until he gets CONT signed by Bob, at which time he sends to Bob and 
Alice the appropriate signed copies. 
A disclosure protocol is needed when Alice and Bob have agreed that Alice will 
disclose to Bob her secret process D for the manufacture of widgets, and Bob 
promises not to divulge D. This agreement mentions D but does not detail it. Such a 
confidential disclosure is often intended to enable Bob to examine D so that he can 
decide whether to buy it. When Alice later on reveals D to Bob she will need a 
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receipt from him, for otherwise she cannot enforce the agreement. However, Bob can 
stop communicating with Alice once he has received D, leaving her without a receipt. 
Confidential disclosure protocols may become important for privacy protection 
procedures in which a person or an organization are given personal information such 
as medical records on condition that they keep the information confidential. 
Mail certification allows Alice to send a message M (“A ton of widgets on its way 
to you”) to Bob with the assurance that she will have a receipt. This differs from 
disclosures in that Bob may be allowed to examine M before deciding wether he 
wants to accept it. 
The Post Office, acting as a trusted intermediary, provides certified return-receipt 
mail. Note, however, that Alice can only obtain a receipt stating that Bob has 
received a letter from her. The content of the letter is not specified. 
The above transactions can be implemented in an electronic mail system by 
establishing message exchange centers which will act as trusted intermediaries for 
every transaction, There are many difficulties involved in this approach, First, the 
centers will be foci for a very heavy traffic load. The center will have to maintain an 
extensive data base to keep track of the transactions for which it acts as intermediary. 
Errors are unavoidable and this raises the question of liability of the intermediary. 
We propose a solution employing a “beacon” which emits at regularly spaced time 
intervals, randomly chosen integers in the range 1 < i 4 k. The beacon can be a 
channel in a communications satellite or a node in a network which can be accessed 
by every participant. The volume of messages emanating from the beacon is actually 
very low and the users have only to listen, so that there will be no bottlenecks. 
It is easy to see that certified mail is impossible without some form of trusted inter- 
mediary, and similarly for the other transactions. Thus it is natural to resort to 
randomized algorithms which will provide a solution, while allowing a certain 
tolerable probability of cheating. 
Our main result is that with a beacon emitting random integers 1 < i < k spaced 
apart at time intervals A, we can have protocols for the signing of contracts, 
disclosures, and certified mail, which require an expected exchange of 2k messages 
per transaction, and will end in expected time kA. Furthermore, the probability of one 
participant in the transaction cheating another is at most l/k. The value l/k is 
actually best possible for any randomized protection protocol for those transactions 
which involves an exchange of 2k messages. 
Actually we shall use two somewhat different versions of the beacon, a signature 
beacon for signing contracts and for certified mail, and a disclosure beacon for 
implementing confidential disclosures. 
The use of randomized protocols for transaction protection was first introduced in 
[5]. The articles [ 1, 21 contain different (randomized) solutions for some of the 
problems treated here, as well as a proof for the above-mentioned lower bound on the 
probability of cheating. The author wishes to thank Manuel Blum for many fruitful 
conversations on the topics of this paper. 
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2. PUBLIC KEY SYSTEMS 
We assume throughout this paper the existence of a public key digital signature 
and encryption system, see [3,4,6]. 
This involves functions E, and D, depending on parameters x and y such that for 
every encoding key K there exists a decoding key d(K) so that for any message M we 
have DdJEK(M)) = M. 
The assumption is that knowledge of K does not provide knowledge of the 
decoding key d(K). On the other hand, the encoding key K can be trivially computed 
from the decoding key. For example, with Rivest et al. [6], we adopt the convention 
that the encoding key is a pair K = (e, n), where n is a product of two large primes 
and E,(M) z M’ mod n. The decoding key is (d, p, q), where n = p . q, p, q primes 
and ed z 1 mod(p - l)(q - 1). In [4] the encoding key is K = (6, n) with n as above, 
and E,(M) 5 M(M + 6) mod n. The decoding key is (b, p, q). 
Each participant P publishes a key selected by him, call it also P, but keeps the 
decoding key d(P) to himself. Actually, key selection proceeds by selecting d(P) and 
constructing P. 
If the mapping M+ E,(M) is essentially an onto mapping, then the public key 
system can also be used to digitally sign a message. We shall denote P’s signature on 
M by S,(M). Sometimes we shall use “M. signed P” to indicate the message M 
digitally signed by P. For example “Will send a ton to Bob. signed Alice.” 
3. THE BEACON 
We shall require two versions of the beacon, one for contract signing and the other 
for confidential disclosures. The beacon will have a public key BN and will broadcast 
at time intervals A. It will time-stamp its messages with the full time of transmission. 
To prevent ambiguity, time is Greenwich Mean Time. Thus if A = 3 seconds, then t = 
10.19.1981, 14:39:54 is a possible time stamp, and t + A = 10.19.1981, 14:39:57. 
Let i := random mean that i is a randomly selected integer in the interval [ 1, k]. A 
signafure beacon behaves according to the following protocol. 
Signature Beacon’s Protocol 
select some future time t,; 
t:=t,; 
while true do 
begin 
i := random; *do before time t” 
at time t broadcast: S,,(i, t); 
t:=t+A 
end 
In order to implement disclosures we need an operation p := randomkey which 
means that a decoding key d(p) is randomly chosen and p is assigned the value of the 
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corresponding public encoding key. Thus the process performing p := randomkey 
knows the public key p as well as the private decoding key d(p). 
Disclosure Beacon’s Protocol 
select a future time t, ; 
t:=t,; 
while true do 
begin 
j := random; *do before time t* 
d := d(p,); *do before time t* 
p1 := randomkey,..., pk := randomkey; *do before time t* 
at time t broadcast: “pl ,..., pk, d, j, t. signed BN”; 
t:=t+A 
end 
Note that at time t, the disclosure beacon broadcasts k public keys for which it 
knows the decoding keys, and the decoding key d for a key randomly selected out of 
those broadcast at time t-A. 
4. CONTRACT SIGNING 
Let us start by considering the situation that Alice and Bob have discussed a 
contract and want to sign it. Let CONTR denote the actual string of characters 
which is the text of the contract and let C be some name for the contract, selected by 
Alice and Bob. In practice C will be a number obtained by applying some hash 
function h to the string denoted by CONTR, i.e., C = h(CONTR). 
The participants will use the signature beacon. Messages of the form it4 = (i, t) will 
be called beacon messages and the broadcasts S,,(M) will be called beacon signals. 
Alice starts by sending Bob a signed message: 
PA = “If Bob can produce (C, M) signed by Alice and M signed by the 
beacon, for some beacon message M, then I, Alice, will be commited 
to “CONTR” as of the time t mentioned in M. signed Alice.” (1) 
Note that Alice is signing the actual string preceding her signature, except that C 
and CONTR are replaced by the number and character string which they denote. 
Bob sends Alice a similarly constructed message P, with the names “Alice” and 
“Bob” interchanged, and signed by him. If Alice does not receive this message, then 
she does not continue with the protocol. In this case nothing has happened because 
Bob does not have Alice’s signature on the contract. 
Let us call the above two signed messages P, and P, the preliminary agreements. 
Now for the actual protocol for the exchange of signatures. We assume that each 
participant, including the beacon, has a clock, and that all of these clocks are 
synchronized. Clock readings are always taken at starting points of the beacon’s time 
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intervals. The notation t := clock means that t is assigned the nearest future clock 
reading. Recall that A and B are, respectively, Alice’s and Bob’s public keys. 
Alice’s Protocol 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
(10) 
willing := true; 
send P, to Bob; 
if received P, then t := clock; *synchronized with Bob* 
if received P, then while willing = true do 
begin 
i, = random; 
send i, to Bob; *after time t, before t + A/6* 
if received i, from Bob then 
i = i, + i, mod k; 
send Bob S,(C, i, t + A); *before t + A/3 * 
if Bob has not returned S,(C, i, t + d) before time t + 243 then 
willing := false; 
wait until time t + A; 
if beacon signal is S&i, t + A) then willing := false; 
t:=t+A 
end 
Bob’s protocol is exactly like Alice’s with “A” and “Alice” replaced by “B” and 
“Bob” and vice versa. 
Comment 1. Alice and Bob must start with assignments t := clock resulting with 
the same value for t. A special protocol is required to ensure this synchronization: we 
omit the details. 
Comment 2. A statement such as “if Bob . ..S.(C, i, t + A),..” in Alice’s protocol 
means that she actually checks Bob’s digital signature on the message received from 
him. The time intervals available are sufficient for these computations. 
If Alice and Bob behave according to the above protocols, then within an expected 
number k of time-intervals, the integer i randomly chosen by Alice and Bob will be 
the one contained in the next beacon message at a time t,. When this happens both 
Alice and Bob will have valid time-stamped signatures on the contract. 
If a dispute arises and, say, Alice denies having signed the contract, then Bob can 
take her to court and prove that she has signed. Namely, Bob will produce the 
preliminary agreement P, detailed in (1) and the signed messages H = S,(C, i, t,), 
G = S&i, t,), All the judge has to do is verify Alice’s digital signatures in P, and H, 
and the beacon’s signature in G. Thus the adjudication of a dispute concerning 
signatures involves just ordinary digital signature verification. The judge need not 
concern himself with the protocols by which P,, H, and G were created. These 
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protocols are followed by Alice and Bob for their own protection and ensure the 
following result. 
THEOREM 1. If Alice and Bob follow their respective protocols, then after 
expected time kA each will have the other’s binding signature on the contract. 
If Alice follows her protocol and Bob tries to cheat her, then his probability of 
obtaining her signature on the contract, without Alice having his signature, is l/k. 
Bob’s probability of being caught, resulting in the contract not being signed at all, is 
1 - l/k. 
The same statement holds for Bob’s probability of being cheated. 
Proof Assume that Alice and Bob start their protocols at time t. Within each 
time interval [t + (n - l)d, t + nd] they exchange messages S,(C, i, t + nd) and 
S,(C, i, t + nd) for some randomly chosen i = i,, 1 < i < k. The probability that at 
time t + nA the beacon’s signal will be S&i, t + nd) is l/k. Thus the protocol will 
end within expected time kd. As explained just before the theorem, when the protocol 
ends, each participant has the other’s binding and time-stamped signature on the con- 
tract. 
Assume that Alice follows her protocol and that Bob does not respond in some 
time interval [t + (n - l)d, t + nd] with S,(i, t + nd), where i = i, is the integer used 
by Alice in that interval. Bob will have Alice’s signature only if the beacon’s signal is 
S&i, t + nd) for the same i, and this will occur with probability l/k. 
If Bob does not respond properly then Alice stops, so that his probability of not 
obtaining a signature at all is 1 - l/k. 
It is clear that Alice’s and Bob’s roles in the protocol are completely 
symmetrical. I 
The above two-party protocol can be readily extended to n participants A 1 ,..., A,, 
who wish to jointly sign a contract. Each participant Ai starts by signing a 
preliminary agreement 
PAi = “If anyone of A, ,..., Ai- i , Ai+ i ,..., A, can produce (C, M) signed by 
A, and M signed by the beacon, for some beacon message M, then 
1, Ai, will be comitted to CONTR as of the time t mentioned in M. 
signed Ai .” 
The protocol for A, is obtained from Alice’s protocol by changing A into Ai, i.e., 
Alice into A,, S, and i, into S,, and iA,. 
j # i...” 
Line 2 is changed to “Send P,, to every Aj, 
Line 3 is changed to “if received every PA,, j # i...“. Line 10 is changed to “if 
not every Aj, j # i, has returned S,(C, i, t + A)..,“. In line 7 have i = 2: iAj mod k; 
etc. 
It is clear that with the appropriate changes, Theorem 1 holds for the case of n 
participants. 
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5. CONFIDENTIAL DISCLOSURES 
We now consider the situation that Alice has a secret DES and has agreed with 
Bob to divulge it to him and he has agreed to keep it confidential. To enforce this 
agreement Alice must be sure that when she discloses the secret to Bob, she will have 
his receipt for DIS. The difference between disclosure in return for a receipt and 
contract signing is that in the latter case the parties know what the contract is and 
just have to insure that everybody signs. With the disclosure, Bob does not know 
what the disclosure DIS is, and DIS itself cannot be used in the protocol in clear, i.e., 
nonencrypted, form. 
We shall use the disclosure beacon to implement a disclosure protocol. 
Let A and B be Alice’s and Bob’s public keys, so that d(A) and d(B) are the 
corresponding private decryption keys. 
Alice and Bob agree on a reference number dis for the disclosure DIS. Alice 
chooses an encryption key K. She doubly encodes DIS by Bob’s key B, followed by 
K, to produce M = E,(E,(DIS)). Alice now sends Bob a signed message 
N, = “M is the result of my disclosure, referred to by dis, being encoded 
by B followed with encoding by K. signed Alice.” (2) 
The idea of the disclosure protocol is that at time t Alice and Bob select an integer 
1 ( i ( k. Bob sends Alice the signed message S,(dis, i, t + d). Alice then sends Bob 
the decoding key d(K), encrypted by the ith key pi released by the beacon at time t, 
i.e., EJd(K)). If at time t + A the beacon releases the decoding key d= d(p,) for the 
same key pi, then provided that Alice behaved according to the protocol, Bob can 
decode: D&T,,(d(K)) = d(K). He can then compute E,(DIS) = D,,,,(M) and DIS = 
~,~,,&(JW)~ 
Recall that the disclosure beacon’s signal at time t + A has the form 
“  -  p, ,..., pk, d, j, t  -t A signed BN”, where d is the decoding key for the pj 
broadcast at time t .  (3) 
By prior agreement, if Bob has sent S,(dis, i, t + A) and the beacon’s signal (3) at 
time t + A satisfies j= i, i.e., d is in fact the decryption key for the ith key pi 
broadcast at time t, then Bob admits to having received DIS unless he can prove that 
the key sent to him by Alice is not d(K). 
Now for the detailed protocols. Alice and Bob start by signing an agreement 
stating that Alice will disclose to Bob information (the disclosure) having certain 
properties. Bob agrees that if he receives the disclosure described by Alice, then he 
will keep it confidential and not use it without Alice’s consent. They agree to refer to 
the disclosure by the number dis. The above agreement will be called the disclosure 
agreement. Note that the disclosure agreement does not detail the disclosure itself. 
Alice now gives Bob her signed obligation N,, see (2). Bob prepares the following 
signed message: 
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N, = “If Alice can produce for some time t and for some i message of the 
form “dis, .i, t + A. signed Bob” and “jJ, ,..., j!,,, d, i, t t A. signed 
BN”, then I am committed to having received the disclosure referred 
to by dis, unless I can produce a message of the form “dis, X, i, t. 
signed Alice” such that Da(X) is not decoding key d(K) for the key 
K. signed Bob.” (4) 
Bob sends N, to Alice. To avoid confusion, let us point out that in the above, dis and 
K are specific numbers (K may be a sequence of numbers). However, d(K) is not a 
number but rather a string such as d(3011028 1). 
Bob’s Disclosure Protocol 
willing := true; 
if received N, from Alice then send her N,; 
if received N, then t := clock; *synchronized with Alice* 
if received N, then while willing = true do 
begin 
i := random; *after time t and before t + A/6* 
send i to Alice; *after time t and before t t A/6* 
send to Alice S,(dis, i, t + A); *before time t + A/3* 
if not received from Alice a message S,(dis, X, i, t) before 
time t + 2A/3 then willing := false; 
wait until time t t A; 
if Beacon signal is S&7,,..., &, d, i, t + A) then willing := false; 
t:=t+A 
end 
Alice’s Disclosure Protocol 
willing := true; 
i :=O; 
send N, to Bob; 
if received N, then t := clock; *synchronized with Bob* 
if received N, then while willing = true do 
begin 
if received i’ from Bob and beacon signal is S&P,,..., pk, d, j, t) 
then i := i’ and X := E,,(d(K)); 
if received S,(dis, i, t + A) from Bob before time t + A/3 then 
send to Bob S,(dis, X, i, t) before time t + 243; 
if at time t + A beacon signal is S,,(jji,..., jjkk, 2, i, t f A) then 
willing := false; 
t:=t+A 
end 
The disclosure protocol has the following properties: 
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THEOREM 2. If Alice and Bob follow their protocols, then within expected time 
kA, Bob will have the disclosure and Alice will have Bob’s receipt for it. 
If Alice follows her protocol, then regardless of what Bob does, tf he receives the 
disclosure, then Alice will have his receipt. Also, Bob cannot cause the disclosure to 
be revealed to a third party before Alice has his receipt. 
If Bob follows his protocol and Alice tries to cheat him, then her probability of 
success is l/k. Her probability of being caught is 1 - I/k, in which case Bob will 
terminate the exchange. 
Proof: Assume that Alice and Bob follow their respective protocols. Let t be a 
beacon time in the execution of the protocols. Bob selects an 1 < i Q k and sends G = 
S,(dis, i, t + A) to Alice. She responds by sending S, (dis, X, i, t), where X = E,,(d(K)) 
and pi is the ith encryption key sent by the beacon at time t. After a A interval, at 
time t + A, the beacon signals 
H = s&p, ,..., pkk, ci, j, t + A), (6) 
where j = random. 
After an expected number k of repetitions, i = j will occur. When this happens then 
d= d(p,), and Bob can tind d(K) = Da(X) and DIS = DdCa,(DdCK,(M)), see (2) for 
the meaning of M. Thus the expected total elapsed time is kd. 
When the coincidence i = j occurs, Alice has Bob’s signature because she has his 
signed preliminary agreement N, , his signed message G, and the beacon’s signed 
signal H. Bob’s escape clause in N, does not apply because t t A is the only time 
when j= i occurs and the X in Alice’s message does decode into d(K). 
If Alice follows her protocol, then she sends Bob the encrypted decoding key 
X = E,,(d(K)) only after receiving N, and G from him. Thus if the beacon’s signal at 
time t + A contains the decoding key d= d(p,), then she already has Bob’s receipt, as 
explained above. 
As long as the beacon does not broadcast at time t t A the decoding key d for the 
key pi used by Alice at time t, Bob cannot compute Ddo,(M) = E,(M). Thus, DIS 
cannot be computed without d(K). Now, the argument in the preceding paragraphs 
shows that whenever the decoding key d(K) is divulged, Alice must have Bob’s 
receipt for DIS. Thus Bob cannot find DIS, or cause it to be disclosed, without his 
first giving Alice the receipt. 
Let us now assume that at time t Alice tries to cheat Bob and let the beacon’s 
signal at time t be SBN(pI,..., pk, d, j, t). If in response to Bob’s message 
S,(dis, i, t + A) she sends S,(dis, Y, i, t), where Y # E,,(d(K)), then even if at time 
t + A the beacon’s signal (6) will satisfy j= i, Alice will not have Bob’s receipt 
because of the escape clause in Bob’s preliminary agreement N,. 
If Alice does not respond at time t with a message of the form S,(dis, Y, i, t), then 
Bob’s protocol realizes this before time t + A and terminates. Alice will then have 
Bob’s receipt only if the beacon’s signal (6) at time t + A satisfies j= i, and the 
probability for this is l/k. 
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Thus Alice’s probability of successfully cheating is l/k. The probability of her 
being caught, resulting in the disclosure procedure (which she presumably wants to 
complete) being terminated by Bob, is 1 - l/k. 
Comment. What happens if in her preliminary agreement Alice uses an M which 
is not E,(E,(DIS))? This is, in a sense, an artificial issue. By Alice’s statement N,, 
the string D,(,, (DdfK)(M)) = R is her disclosure. If the disclosure procedure goes 
through, then Bob would be comitted to the confidentiality of this R whatever it may 
be. However, if R does not have the properties promised by Alice in the Disclosure 
Agreement (DA), for example, if she stated that DIS is a sorting program and R is a 
nonsense message or a description of a chemical process, then Bob is not obligated to 
confidentiality because the excape clause in the DA will apply. Questions arise only 
when it is difficult to determine if R satisfies the conditions in the DA. Thus Bob 
should insist that the DA define the disclosure as accurately as possible without 
actually revealing it. How to do this is a problem associated with disclosures, no 
matter what signature method is used. 
The above problem does not arise in what may become the main application of the 
disclosure protocol, namely, disclosure of personal information. If Alice is a keeper of 
a data bank of personal files and agrees to disclose to Bob medical records of a 
person P, then DIS is uniquely defined by specifying P in the Disclosure Agreement. 
If for the M in Alice’s N, the decoding Dd&d(X#4)) does not read like P’s 
medical record, then Bob is not obligated to confidentiality. If that decoding looks 
like P’s record but is not, then there is against Alice a provable case of supplying 
false information. 
6. CERTIFIED MAIL 
We can now formulate protocols for certified mail. Assume that Alice wishes to 
send Bob a message M in return for a receipt. There are two possible cases. 
In the first case Alice does not mind Bob’s seeing the message before he formally 
agrees to accept it. Bob wants a signed message so that Alice will not be able to 
disown it later. Alice wants a receipt. 
This case is subsumed by contract signing. Namely, Alice and Bob formulate a 
contract stating that Alice is sending, and Bob is accepting, the message M. They 
then sign this contract, thereby completing the certified mail procedure. 
If Alice does not want to show Bob the message beforehand and he is still willing 
to accept it, then they follow the disclosure protocol but without the disclosure 
agreement because no promise of confidentiality is involved. 
By definition, Bob’s receipt is for D dcB,(DdcK,(A4)), whatever that may be, where M 
is the string contained in Alice’s N,. 
7. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
We want to discuss three aspects of our solution: the feasibility of a beacon, the 
implementation and reliability of the protocols, and the role of the judge in case of 
disputes. 
511/27/2-9 
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It is clear that the viability of our protocols depends on the “honesty” of the 
beacon. If any participant has advance knowledge of the beacon’s messages, then he 
can cheat his partner. Thus the beacon must be managed by a trusted party and 
ensured to be tamper proof. The fact that there is only one beacon with a very simple 
behavior makes it easier to achieve this. The beacon should use some physical 
method, rather than a pseudo random number generator, to produce the random 
numbers it needs. 
If the beacon breaks down during its operation, say between time t and t + A, the 
protocol’s security is not impaired. As soon as the beacon resumes, the contract 
signing or disclosure protocols can resume. 
It was pointed out by J. Reif that the beacon may be temporarily locally jammed 
either accidentally or maliciously. This may create a situation where one party to a 
transaction will know that a contract is already signed while the other, who was 
unable to listen, does not know. To prevent this, we can have a backup station which 
records and preserves the beacon’s signals for a short duration. The protocol can be 
suspended and this station can be actively queried for a missing signal when the need 
arises. 
Contract signing and disclosures, as well as digital signatures in general, can be 
implemented by rather simple special purpose signature machines. Such a machine, 
once given the contract or disclosure text, will execute the protocol quickly and 
reliably, and the whole exchange will be machine to machine without human inter- 
vention. The signature machine will also automatically prepare the preliminary 
agreements from the contracts or disclosures in question. 
What value for k will give sufficient protection? An argument can be made that a 
moderate value such as k = 30 or k = 100 is sufficient for all practical purposes. If 
k = 100 and A = 3 seconds, then an expected time of about 5 minutes will be required 
for the completion of a transaction. 
For k = 100, the probability of successfully cheating is l/100. We should bear in 
mind that a transaction such as contract signing is not an adversary game where the 
participants try to obtain each other’s signature without giving their own signatures. 
If there are no safeguards, then participants may delay returning their signature and 
thereby gain an advantage. But when there are safeguards such as use of an inter- 
mediary, then current experience is that in the overwhelming majority of instances 
participants play according to the rules and do not try to cheat. 
Thus, with the contract signing and disclosure protocols proposed here, we should 
expect that only very rarely will a participant even try to circumvent the signature 
box and cheat a partner to a transaction. In the rare event that somebody will try to 
cheat, his chances of success are, for k = 100, just l/100 and his probability for 
being immediately found out and thereby losing the whole deal is 99/100. Note that 
nowadays the percentage of signature frauds discovered immediately upon commision 
is much smaller. The threat of almost certain exposure will in itself act as a further 
deterrent. All in all, a value such as k = 100 will be sufficient to make the occurrence 
of successful frauds very rare. 
As a further precaution against a participant who tries a rash of cheating attempts 
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against many partners, the network can have a central clearinghouse for complaints 
involving fraud attempts. A participant against whom there are many complaints, and 
this is bound to happen if he makes numerous attepts to cheat, can be suspended 
from the network. 
The judge is not a trusted intermediary in disguise. When Alice and Bob carry out 
a transaction such as contract signing according to the protocol, each has the other’s 
binding signature. The validity of the signatures is mathematically testable, so that 
there is no way they can disown the obligation. Still, it may happen that a party to an 
agreement chooses to cause trouble and goes to court. But these cases are a relative 
minority. If matters deteriorate to the point that a large proportion of all contracts 
end in court, then the whose notion of a contract as an instrument for preventing 
disputes becomes impractical. Thus under normal conditions the judge will not be 
somebody to whom every contract is brought for signature verification, but an 
authority for settling relatively rare disputes concerning signatures. 
Since the verification of valid signatures is so unequivocal, a fine can be prescribed 
for anybody who brings a nuisance suit about the validity of signatures. This will not 
prevent lawsuits involving the substance of contracts, but will prevent litigation 
concerning valid signatures. 
In summation, we have a convenient method for transaction protection which, by 
protocols not much more complicated than the basic digital signature procedures, 
affords a great measure of security. Currently many transactions such as instructions 
to brokers and fund transfers are most often done without on the spot signatures. It 
would be desirable to have binding proof for the authorship and receipt of such 
instructions, but present day paper documentation makes it impossible to keep up 
with the volume of traffic. In the coming era of electronic computer to computer mail, 
transaction protection can easily be extended to cover these situations. 
We feel that protection of privacy through the disclosure protocol, which obtains a 
receipt from the receiver of confidential personal information, may become an 
important application of the methods in this paper. 
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